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The Bumbling Airline Bomber, Stupid Reactions, and 8 Real Security Takeaways

Ira Winkler on what we should really learn from the failed Northwest Airlines bombing attempt

By Ira Winkler

January 03, 2010 — CSO —

I am cynical of the recent attempt to bring down the Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. The fact that there is a terrorist attempt is nothing new, and is frankly expected. However, the reactions and claimed outrage indicate more incompetence than concern for security.

Looking at the reactions to the failed attack, you would think that this was some brilliantly planned attack by a determined enemy. You would think that there was nothing that could have been done to prevent the attack. Now that we know details about the attempt, you would also think that there is a clear plan to prevent future attacks.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Also see Winkler's column "I Was Wrong—There Probably Will Be a Digital Pearl Harbor"

Pulling together security bulletins, it appears that the suspect boarded the airplane with an explosive packet sewn into his underwear. Near the end of the flight, he went into the bathroom for an extended period of time, went back to his seat, put a blanket over himself claiming to have a stomachache, and attempted to detonate the explosive. However, the detonator malfunctioned and started a small fire instead.

Many people are second-guessing the sequence of events, and putting ridiculous security measures in place in response. Instead of actually securing air travel, these measures are more like a handbook of what NOT to do. Here are a few of the lessons we should really learn from this incident.

1. Security countermeasures seem intrusive—until something happens.
First and foremost, this attack could have been easily prevented if airports used full-body scanning. The TSA previously attempted to get full-body scanning implemented at major airports; however, privacy advocates and a grossly ignorant public were afraid of scanners seeing their genitals. [Editor's note: See the opposing viewpoint in this 2004 Q&A with Jeffrey Rosen.] They would rather people smuggle weapons on board, as opposed to someone seeing they are wearing Spanks to hold in their fat.

While a full-body scan would have easily detected the explosives, people saw their little self-centered picture instead of the big picture. Unfortunately, it is incidents like this that will make people rethink what is a very useful security tool.

2.There is a practical limit to the usefulness of some tools.
Whether or not the alleged terrorist was subjected to a pat-down search, there is a practical limit to the usefulness of a pat-down. For example, security screeners are trained to lightly tap people with the back of their hands, which have little sensitivity. Many of them are also very hesitant to touch the genital region. It is therefore no surprise that the suspect sewed the explosives in his underwear. When police pat down a suspect, they know that they have to grab the crotch as they are afraid of hidden weapons. To police officers, it is very possibly a life and death situation.