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Container Security: Who's In Charge?

Guest columnist Jim Giermanski takes issue - actually seven specific issues - with DHS comments on the role of technology in container security.

By James Giermanski

Page 5

Statement 7
In discussing the need for issuing another RFI, this time for technology involving "crane-mounted" radiation detection technology to use at seaports to detect shielded radiation, Ahern said:
"The reliability, ruggedness, and standard operating procedures associated with this technology will not be extensively evaluated during these tests as field validation activity would be the logical course of action after testing with surrogates and actual threat material, but this requires more time."

Response
The problem is that these so-called crane-mounted scanners cannot detect shielded radiation at this time, and it will take years to develop them. Congress knew that the technology did not exist when the legislation was drafted. In referencing the requirement to scan at foreign ports, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 reflects the following with respect to its application:
...shall apply with respect to containers loaded on a vessel in a foreign country on or after the earlier of--(A) July 1, 2012; or (B) such other date as may be established by the Secretary under paragraph (3). (Section 1701)
Therefore, Congress is expecting that new portal machines, or in Ahern's statement, crane-mounted machines, will be developed and commercialized to detect dangerous radiation. The GAO -- in April of 2007 (GAO-07-347R, Combat Nuclear Smuggling) -- stated very clearly that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) established and responsible for ASP development has not even collected all the testing data on its basic PVT portal detectors and is not close to any developed ASP portal detector. Experts do not expect a commercial version of the ASP anytime soon, if ever. We do not have the machines now, and we won't likely have them in 5 years (in 2012) as indicated by Congress. Therefore, Congress allowed for an extension until such time that these radiation portal detection machines become available.
However, the physics of detection are fairly simple. Gamma rays and neutrons from shielded HEU are detectable at only short distances and only when there is adequate time to count a sufficient number of detected particles. Five basic issues are relevant: the mass of the HEU core, the degree of shielding, the size of the radiation detector, the distance to the source, and the time necessary to integrate photon counts. Therefore, the closer a detector is to the source of emission and the longer it "sniffs," the greater the probability of detecting HEU. So the natural question is: does CBP know this and has it actually read the 9-11 Bill? Why is there an intention of developing crane-mounted scanning that cannot detect shielded uranium any time soon, when there are in-container systems that can detect it now?
They say we need to develop CSDs when they already exist. They say we need to develop portal and crane-mounted scanners to detect shielded enriched uranium when this detection capability already exists for use in containers. They say that doors are what is really important and are satisfied with bolting them when surreptitious container intrusions are not made through the doors. They say that CSDs will disrupt a flow, when CBP's current "layered" approach actually disrupts the flow of commerce. They say they don't know about any industry CSDs when there is a global market with U.S. entrants like IBM, Lockheed Martin, GE, Motorola, GlobalTrac, and Powers International with others like Raytheon considering entry. Then we have Astrium, Siemens, and Zoca in the EU, one of which is producing its product which includes a U.S. patent.