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In Depth

Nation States' Espionage and Counterespionage

An overview of the 2007 Global Economic Espionage Landscape

By Christopher Burgess

Page 9

The Czech Republic has a clear understanding of where its problems originate, and its willingness to confront Russia for its activities is commendable. The question remains, however, as to whether the Czech companies affected by the Russian intelligence activities are being provided sufficient data to protect themselves.

Qatar learns one of its neighbors has eyes on Qatar oil

In late November 2007, a U.S. citizen employee of Qatar Petroleum, John Willis Donez, saw his sentence of life imprisonment upheld by the Qatar appellate court. Donez, was caught attempting to sell what was characterized as "highly sensitive economic information to an Asian country bordering the Gulf," according to the local daily Al-Raya. A search of Donez's home following his arrest discovered a CD containing sensitive information regarding oil fields in the north of Qatar.

We often hear of the "foreign national" threat, and it would seem to apply here in Qatar. In this case, the foreign national, Donez, had no allegiance with or long-term perspective on protecting Qatar's strategic interests (the oil fields).All would benefit if the government of Qatar shared the name of the country and the means by which the covert operation was conducted.

Swedish sees foreign intelligence active

The Swedish Security Service (SÃ¤kerhetspolisen, or SÃPO) has revealed via an update to its Web site, dated late November 2007, that 15-plus foreign intelligence organizations are active in Sweden. SÃPO notes, "The intelligence actors active in Sweden or targeting Swedish interests in other countries are working on a broad and systematic scale to access information relating to politics, economy, the armed forces, advanced technology and research." The acquisition of "sources" or "agents" within Swedish companies and government by foreign intelligence officers is of interest to SÃPO, and the organization notes that these intelligence officers often are working under false pretences, such as diplomat, journalist or businessman.

Continuing how only some of these intelligence officers are declared to the Swedish government, SÃPO goes on to note how "signals intelligence," or the interception of wireless communication, in Sweden is not illegal, but interception of a "cable-transmitted signal is illegal." Perhaps SÃPO is signaling to all that their communications in Sweden may be acquired, analyzed and processed by any with the technical capabilities to achieve what is known as SIGINT, or signals intelligence collection.

Korean intellectual property of interest both at home and from afar

In 2007, the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) advised that its investigative efforts uncovered and allowed for the indictment of both current and former employees of Korea's second largest automaker, as well as one of the premier steel-making conglomerates, for taking and then sharing intellectual property with Chinese firms. The Korean prosecutor's office and the NIS are focused on industrial spying with a foreign bent.