Front and Center: Security at Boston's Infectious Disease Research Lab

When controversy hit, Kevin Tuohey became the public face of a high-profile plan to study deadly diseases in Boston. To succeed, the security director would have to become part diplomat, part great communicator.

Also by April 2004, a large contingent of Boston's academic community had allied itself with the community groups. Dr. David Ozonoff of BU's School of Public Health and professor Daniel Goodenough of Harvard Medical School were outspoken. Ozonoff called "the whole bioterrorism initiative" a "catastrophe" for public health. Goodenough accused BU of "environmental racism." "Putting something like this in the poor community with such a weak political voice, there's no question if this were in Brookline, Newton or Wellesley"&mdash:tony suburbs&mdash:"this wouldn't happen."

The activists sent an open letter to the mayor, city council and BU trustees opposing the biolab, signed by 165 academics, public health officials, and ACE. "High-level safety and security procedures will be installed," the letter conceded. "However, there can be no guarantees that there will be no accidents that might lead to the release of deadly, airborne pathogens through the failure of safety systems or when they are transported through city streets. The laboratory might also become a target for intentional acts of violence."

What's remarkable about this statement is that the risks cited come straight from Tuohey's list of five risks to mitigate. Tuohey, in defending the lab, would say the same exact thing.

The difference between supporters and opponents is their interpretation of these risks. Opponents said whatever benefit the lab might provide cannot outweigh the risks it presents to the community. Tuohey found himself defending the project from attacks and from information disseminated by an aggressive opponent, information that he believed was misleading. (By this time, BU Medical Center had launched BostonBiosafety.com as a counter to ACE's anti-lab campaign, and had begun advertising the project's benefits on subway trains.)

And the criticisms he's countering often go well beyond security and safety. So when opponents talk about the NEIDL being a biodefense project of little value or counterproductive to public health, it's Tuohey who brings up the threat of an avian flu outbreak and the need to research it at a facility like the NEIDL. When detractors suggest the NEIDL's siting is racist, it's Tuohey who says that the kind of redundancy in utilities, power generation and other critical infrastructures that the new facility will demand already exist there for the hospital.

And when opponents outline risks the NEIDL poses, it's

Tuohey who tells residents, politicians and the media that the opponents' statements are correct. But he would go on: "A release is a scary scenario. I understand that. I've never said there's no risk and I never will. But I can tell you we modeled that four times. We modeled dropping a test tube with more anthrax in it than we'll ever use. We modeled HEPA [particle filter] failures. After the community came to us with concerns, we looked at how the infectious agents would be transported to the lab. In all our tests, none created a risk to the health of the community. Individuals being infected? Yes, that's a risk. It's not likely but it's possible."