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Deconstructing DHS

Terrorism is one kind of plague; some say bureaucracy is another. Can the Department of Homeland Security manage to overcome both?

By Scott Berinato

March 01, 2004 — CSO — When the national antiterrorism threat condition changed hue from Elevated Yellow to High Orange last December, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, following what had become standard procedure for such alerts, issued a statement to the public explaining the move.

"The strategic indicators, including al-Qaida's continued desire to carry out attacks against our homeland, are perhaps greater now than at any point since Sept. 11, 2001," Ridge said. "The information we have indicates that extremists abroad are anticipating near-term attacks that they believe will either rival or exceed the attacks that occurred...two years ago.... We expect al-Qaida will strive for new attacks designed to be more devastating than the Sept. 11 attack, possibly involving nonconventional weapons such as chemical or biological agents."

Finally, Ridge said, "I encourage you to continue with your holiday plans. Gather with your family and friends, and enjoy the spirit of the season."

This was an extraordinary non sequitur, yet it perfectly demonstrated the paradoxical nature of DHS's mission: Alert but don't scare. Be honest but reassure. Prevent but don't lock down. Delicate balances abound.

Ridge knew that the plausible but unverifiable notion that terrorists might like to disrupt America's holidays would weigh on the economy and our spirits. But both may have sunk even harder had he omitted the entreaty to spread holiday cheer. On the other hand, if he had resisted issuing an orange alert at all when credible chatter was flying aboutsomething DHS had tried beforenerves would have frayed over that too. Or worse, DHS could be accused of ineffective idleness, a serious charge when you're spending billions of dollars to build a mega-bureaucracy. Ridge's statement may have whipsawed citizens, but what was the alternative?

The answer to that question is unclear, whether it's applied to orange alerts or to DHS as a whole. In fact, for both you could correctly say that so far no one knows exactly how DHS will fulfill its mission or, more importantly, if it even can.

In this issue, CSO launches a series of stories, to be presented during the next few months, called "Deconstructing DHS." The series will take a look at how DHS rises to the precarious challenge of doing enough to improve security, but not so much as to smother liberty. We'll consider the ways in which DHS and its constituentscitizens and partners like youare adjusting to life ruled by a new, never-before-tested risk equation. Broadly, this equation might be expressed as: protection x the appearance of protection + a federal bureaucratic infrastructure = a lower chance of terrorist attack. Or, as USA Today put it, "Does a small city like Zanesville [Ohio] really need a radiation detector and nerve agent test kit? Does Appleton, Wis., need a fully outfitted bomb squad? Does Grand Forks, N.D., need a semiarmored van and decontamination tents?" For CSO and, we believe, for our readers, these questions and others like them are not rhetorical.