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DHS Decision-Making: Competence or Character?

Guest columnist Dr. James Giermanski looks at container security and argues that the Department of Homeland Security suffers from "seriously flawed decision-making".

By Dave Gradijan

January 11, 2008 — CSO —

By Dr. James Giermanski

Recently I met with a small group of former FBI agents at a monthly breakfast.  The conversations, usually connected to past Bureau activities, moved to the discussion and criticism of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  The flavor of comments follow: they’re out of touch with industry in the container security area; they’re in the pocket of big business; they lack vision; they’re arrogant; and they don’t have leadership; they lack talent; and more. However, while some old crusty ex-agents said it was “all of the above,” the consensus, if there was one, was that the fundamental problem within the Department was weak and sometimes flawed leadership. While I would expect those comments about DHS from a competitive agency, thinking about the breakfast discussion later that day, it occurred to me that, perhaps, this really is a core problem, especially with container security. Therefore, I put together three examples of what I believe represents seriously flawed decision-making important to our security and reflective of questionable and inept leadership within the Department.  

All examples involve decision-making tied to container security.  The first example involves leadership incongruence within DHS as demonstrated by CBP’s focus on and fascination with the electronic sensing of “doors only” access or entry into a sealed container.  The second is the commitment to radio frequency (RF) devices for container security such as either RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tags already in use at our ports, or according to CBP’s Request for Information (RFI)  dated December 12, 2007, the potential use of Bluetooth-related technology using prescribed frequency ranges published and available through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  The third example is CBP’s incredible reliance on import security programs with their inherent core concern for “inbound” container security to the exclusion of “export” container security.   Only short examples of each of these three fixations will or should demonstrate the level of competent leadership within DHS, perhaps making credible the talk around the former agents’ breakfast table.

1. Doors Only
For some time now, when treating conveyance security devices, both DHS and CBP have focused on only doors. First, in November 2005, a Request for Information (RFI), an information-gathering and planning vehicle used by DHS in support of Customs and Border Protection, Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory on behalf of DHS stated, "The purpose of this request is to gather information to identify and evaluate available state-of-the-art container and trailer tracking devices suitable for in-bond shipments."  The level of sophistication needed and stated in the RFI seems clear.

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