This week, one of our C-level executives suffered a personal security incident that spilled over to the workplace. Here's what happened.
The executive's Yahoo email password was compromised, which she learned after hearing from friends who told her that they had received messages from her requesting money to deal with a crisis. You've probably heard similar stories, but whoever hacked the executive's email was a bit more clever than the average cybercrook. One friend was suspicious of the request and asked for verification of the executive's identity. Most email hijackers would probably give up and move on to another victim at that point, but this hacker had sifted through the executive's emails and learned enough about her family, vacations and health issues to trick the friend and dupe her into wiring the money.
At issue: A C-level executive's Yahoo Mail client was hacked, opening the way for the hacker to get into the corporate network.
Action plan: Change all her SaaS and domain passwords, fast.
Naturally, the executive had used her Yahoo Mail account for a variety of activities, including setting up accounts with her bank, her brokerage, an airline and various shopping sites. The Yahoo account had received emails containing clear-text passwords when she had forgotten them. Worse, she often used the same password for multiple accounts.
I advised her to abandon the email account and to contact all of her friends and let them know that they should disregard any mail from that address. But that action, or simply changing the password, probably wouldn't be enough to stem the damage. Most identity thieves will download all the email from a compromised account, as well as data such as calendars and contact lists, to a local computer. This is quite simple, since many webmail clients allow customers to use more feature-rich email clients such as Microsoft Outlook to download email. So even if the account were shut down or the password changed, the hacker would probably still have all of its contents.
Because the compromised content could not be safeguarded, I also told her to file a police report; contact all banks, credit card companies, brokerages and other organizations with which she had done business online; file a fraud alert with the major credit agencies; sign up for a credit-monitoring service; and obtain a new email address and update all of her accounts with that address. I also warned her to refrain from using any PCs, including her home PC, until we could verify their integrity, since we still didn't know how her password had been compromised.
In the course of our conversation, I learned that this incident had implications for the company. You see, we have increased our use of software as a service to the point that we now use more SaaS offerings than on-premises applications. Some might see this as an achievement. I see it as a security nightmare.
As I've explained in past articles, most SaaS vendors have focused more on functionality and accessibility than on security. This incident is a perfect example of how that approach can lead to problems. The executive had a habit of forgetting her passwords for SaaS applications, and she gave me a list of seven SaaS apps that had sent password reset notices to her hacked email account -- in clear, unencrypted text!
Fortunately, none of the data used with these particular apps was extremely sensitive. But she had used her domain password for all of the applications. This meant we had to change her domain password and then log in to all the other applications -- about 15 altogether -- that were not synchronized with Active Directory or configured for single sign-on.
Needless to say, this was not a good day for this executive. But on a positive note, I did get a sponsor for my security awareness and training program.
This week's journal is written by a real security manager, "Mathias Thurman," whose name and employer have been disguised for obvious reasons. Contact him at email@example.com.
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